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The Debate over the State
of U.S. Manufacturing
How the Computer Industry Affects the
Numbers and Perceptions

S

ince 2000, the U.S. manufacturing
sector has lost 5.5 million jobs, or
about a third of its employment base. In
response to these employment losses, a
large trade deficit in manufactured goods,
and concerns that U.S. manufacturing is
losing its international competitiveness,
President Obama recently announced the
creation of a new cabinet-level Office of
Manufacturing Policy.
The administration’s move to develop
policies promoting U.S. manufacturing
has many detractors, however. At the heart
of the debate over the appropriate policy
response is a basic disagreement over the
actual state of U.S. manufacturing. Those
who oppose government intervention
typically argue there is little need.
They point to robust output growth
in manufacturing that, except during
recessions, has outpaced average annual
growth of the U.S. economy for decades.
Employment losses, it is argued, are
largely a consequence of extraordinary
productivity growth, which in turn reflects
automation, not import competition. The
U.S. manufacturing sector is healthy,
according to this view. There is little or
nothing to fix.1
The purpose of this article is to help
reconcile the apparently contradictory
sets of statistics that are brought to the
debate. In particular, I argue that the
aggregate manufacturing output and

productivity statistics so commonly cited
are widely misinterpreted.
Aggregate statistics mask quite
divergent trends within manufacturing.
The rapid output and productivity
growth of the manufacturing sector is
largely attributable to one small industry:
computers and electronic products.
For most of manufacturing, output
growth has been relatively weak and
productivity growth modest. In addition,
the extraordinary output growth in the
U.S. computer industry does not signal
U.S. competitiveness in manufacturing
computer and electronic products, and
productivity growth has not caused
the steep employment declines in this
industry.
Different Statistics
Paint Different Pictures
Output statistics such as those
depicted in Figure 1 paint a rosy picture
of the U.S. manufacturing sector. The
figure, which plots indexes of real (priceadjusted) GDP and manufacturing value
added from 1997 to 2011, shows that,
except during recessions, growth in
manufacturing real value added outpaced
growth in real GDP. Over the entire time
period, manufacturing output growth was
greater than that of GDP.
In spite of its strong output growth,
manufacturing employment has been
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Figure 1 Growth in Real GDP and Manufacturing Value Added, 1997–2011
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declining as a share of nonfarm payroll
employment since the 1970s (Figure 2).
The divergent output and employment
trends are typically explained by the
fact that labor productivity growth in
manufacturing has also greatly outpaced
that in the aggregate economy. From
this perspective, recent employment
declines in manufacturing seem part of
a long-term trend. Numerous analysts
have made analogies between the

manufacturing sector and agriculture,
which has experienced high output
growth, but supports few jobs owing
to the automation of farming. (See, for
example, Reich [2009], Executive Office
of the President [2009], and Roxburgh et
al. [2012].)
A closer look at the manufacturing
employment numbers, however, reveals
a clear break in trend since 2000. Figure
2, which also plots manufacturing

Figure 2 Manufacturing Employment, Number and as Percent of Nonfarm Payroll
Employment, 1970-2011
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employment levels from 1970 to the
present, shows that manufacturing
employment was relatively stable or
experienced modest trend declines until
2000.2 From 2000 to 2002 manufacturing
employment fell by 2 million, or 12
percent, and during the ensuing economic
upturn, manufacturing employment
continued to fall; this marked the first
time manufacturing employment failed to
rebound following a recession. Over the
decade from 2000 to 2010, manufacturing
employment declined by 5.7 million,
or one-third. The sudden and sharp
employment losses in the manufacturing
sector are hard to fully square with a
story about productivity improvements
driven by automation. And although press
reports have heralded manufacturing’s
employment gains in the last year, they
are small compared to its losses during
the Great Recession. Today, nonfarm
payroll employment is 96 percent of what
it was in 2007, immediately prior to the
start of the recession; manufacturing
employment is just 87 percent.
Trade statistics also give cause
for concern about the state of U.S.
manufacturing. Eighteen of the 19
industries in the manufacturing sector run
sizable trade deficits, according to data
published by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis; that is, the United States
imports more than it exports in these
industries’ product categories. Moreover,
between 1998 (the first year that these
industry-level data are published) and
2007, the ratio of net exports (exports less
imports) to domestic use of an industry’s
products worsened. This implies that
domestic manufacturing output failed
to keep pace with domestic use of
manufactured goods. The picture has
been more mixed since 2007, reflecting
the worldwide recession, but apparel,
textiles, furniture, autos, electrical
appliances, and computers continued to
show a loss of competitiveness by this
metric.
What Accounts for Manufacturing’s
High Output Growth?
Manufacturing’s strong growth in
real value added seems at odds with
the weak employment numbers and
trade performance. These apparently
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Figure 3 Average Annual Growth
Rates of Real Value Added in
Computers and Manufacturing
without Computers
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aggregate manufacturing statistics.
Without the computer industry,
manufacturing real value-added growth
has been much weaker than overall
growth in the economy (Figure 4).3 The
computer industry has a similarly large
impact on the aggregate manufacturing
productivity statistics. For example,
manufacturing multifactor productivity
growth rates between 1997 and 2007
fall by almost half when the computer
industry is excluded (Houseman et al.
2011).
The growth rates in Figures 3 and
4 are based on published data. In
addition, the sizable growth of imported
intermediates used in manufacturing has
likely imparted a significant bias to real
value added in the published statistics
for all manufacturing industries. This
bias arises because the price declines
associated with the shift in sourcing
to low-cost countries are not properly
captured, which in turn results in an
underestimation of the real growth in
imports and an overestimation of the
growth in real value added produced
domestically. Accounting for offshoring
bias, the average annual growth rate
in real value added for manufacturing
excluding computers was well under
1 percent between 1997 and 2007
(Houseman et al. 2011).
What Accounts for the Extraordinary
Growth in Real Value Added and
Productivity in the Computer Industry
and What Does It Mean?
Is the computer and electronic
products industry, which includes
computers, semiconductors, and
telecommunications equipment, the
bright spot in American manufacturing?
Not necessarily. Although some computer
and electronics products companies
headquartered in the United States are
highly successful in product innovation
and are competitive in international
markets, the United States does not
produce high-volume products in
this industry anymore (Sturgeon and
Kawakami 2010). And trade statistics
cited above indicate that domestic
production has not kept pace with
consumption, leading to a widening trade
deficit in these products.

Figure 4 Average Annual Growth
Rates of Real GDP and
Manufacturing Value Added
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contradictory trends can be reconciled
to a large degree by the fact that the
manufacturing output statistics mask
divergent trends within the manufacturing
sector.
Figure 3 shows average annual growth
in real value added for the computers
and electronic products industry and for
manufacturing excluding the computer
industry from 1997 to 2007 (the decade
leading up to the Great Recession)
and from 2000 to 2010 (a period that
incorporates the recession). Real value
added in the computer industry grew at
a staggering rate of 22 percent per year
from 1997 to 2007 and 16 percent per
year from 2000 to 2010. In contrast,
average annual growth of real value
added in the rest of manufacturing was
just 1.2 percent per year from 1997 to
2007; real value added in the rest of
manufacturing was actually about 6
percent lower in 2010 than at the start of
the decade.
Although the computer and electronics
products industry only accounted for
10–12 percent of value added in the
manufacturing sector throughout the
period, it has an outsized effect on
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What accounts then for the rapid
growth in real value added in this
industry? At least part of the explanation
concerns the adjustment of price
indexes used to deflate computers and
semiconductors for improvements in
quality. Computers and semiconductors
are much more powerful today than they
were a decade or even a year or two ago.
Although product price indexes typically
increase over time, for computers
and semiconductors they have fallen
rapidly. Largely reflecting adjustments
by statistical agencies to account for
the increased power of computers and
semiconductors, the price indexes used
to adjust shipments of computers and
semiconductors have fallen at a rate
of 21 percent and 13 percent per year,
respectively, from 1998 to 2010. Such
rapid price drops imply, for example, that
for the same dollar value of computer
shipments, the quality-adjusted quantity
(real value) is 13 times higher in 2010
than in 1998.4
The rapid growth in real output
coupled with a sharp drop in employment
has led to surging productivity in the
computer industry. But has productivity
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growth caused these employment
declines? Analysts often interpret
productivity growth to mean that workers
are working faster or that automation
(the substitution of capital for labor)
is driving the growth, as illustrated
in a recent White House report on
manufacturing: “Manufacturing workers
have paradoxically often been the victims
of their sector’s own success, as rapid
productivity growth has meant that goods
can be produced with fewer workers”
(Executive Office of the President 2009).
Underpinning the computer industry’s
rapid productivity growth, however, are
price deflators that, when adjusted for
quality improvements, are rapidly falling.
The productivity growth in the computer
industry largely reflects research and
development innovations, and product
improvements do not cause job losses.
Today’s computer may be in some
statistical sense the equivalent of, say, 13
computers in 1998, but that does not, in
and of itself, mean that fewer workers are
needed to manufacture a computer today
than in the past. In fact, job losses in the
computer industry are attributable to the
shift of electronics product manufacturing
to Asia (see, for example, Roxburgh et al.
2012).
Conclusion
Strong output and productivity
statistics have led many to dismiss outof-hand concerns about the international
competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing.
The computer and electronics products
industry, however, is driving these high
growth rates in the aggregate statistics,
despite the fact that this industry accounts
for only about 10 percent of the sector’s
value added and employment. The
irony is that high output growth in the
computer industry is a poor metric of
the competitiveness of U.S. factories in
making computer and related electronic
products. The manufacturing of these
products has largely moved to Asia.
Competition from foreign suppliers, not
high productivity growth, is responsible
for the sharp employment declines in the
computer industry.
Understanding the international
competitiveness of manufacturing and
the consequences of import competition
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for workers and businesses is critical for
developing sound manufacturing policy.
As a start, analysts and policymakers
should recognize that the aggregate
output and productivity statistics are not
representative of what is happening in
most of manufacturing.
Notes
1. See, for example, Kevin Hasset, http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-16/
obama-s-obsession-drives-progress-inreverse-commentary-by-kevin-hassett.html
and Mark J. Perry, http://blog.american.
com/2012/02/u-s-manufacturing-is-alreadydoing-remarkably-well-without-taxpayerhelp/. Atkinson et al. (2012, pp. 24–25)
includes citations to many other prominent
analysts and policymakers promoting this
view.
2. The modest declines in manufacturing
employment during the 1990s can be
accounted for entirely by manufacturers’
increased use of staffing industry workers,
who are not counted as manufacturing
employees. Although in official statistics
manufacturing employment declined by
4.1 percent from 1989 to 2000, taking
into account temporary help and other
staffing workers assigned to manufacturing,
employment rose by an estimated 1.3 percent
(Dey, Houseman, and Polivka forthcoming).
3. The reason this fact is not more widely
known may have to do with the way the
statistics are published. In the late 1990s, the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, along with
the other U.S. statistical agencies, introduced
the use of chained aggregates. Although
BEA publishes value added in “real chained
dollars” for all individual manufacturing
industries, these industry-level real chained
dollars cannot be summed to create a real
series for subsets of industries. Growth rates
for industry subsets may be approximated
using a Törnqvist formula that uses both
real and nominal value-added industry data.
Specifically, the growth rate of real valueadded for a subset of industries, expressed as
a logarithmic change, is approximately equal
to the weighted average of the growth rates of
the component industries,
ln(Qt / Qt 1 ) | ¦ wi ,t ln(qi ,t / qi ,t 1 )
i

where qi,t is the published real dollar or
(equivalently) quantity index for industry i
in year t and wi,t is the average of industry i’s
share of nominal value added in adjacent time
periods (t, t − 1); ¦wit = 1.
i

4. The statistics for the computer and
electronics products industry also may be
subject to significant measurement error, in
addition to that discussed above. This industry
has been characterized by rapid shifts in the
sourcing of production and the development
of global production chains that are difficult to
capture in our statistical system, as currently
designed. Such measurement error is the
subject of on-going research supported by a
Sloan Foundation grant that I am codirecting.
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Bridget Timmeney and Kevin Hollenbeck

What Works in Forming
a Successful Employer
Resource Network?
This article summarizes findings from a recent
issue brief on Employer Resource Networks
(Timmeney and Hollenbeck 2012).

E

mployer Resource Networks
(ERNs) evolved in western Michigan
over the last 10 years in response
to business owners’ concerns about
the retention and skill levels of their
workforces. These business owners have
realized that recruitment and retention
of a qualified workforce are central
ingredients for organizational success.
Out of these concerns arose consortia of
businesses that leverage resources for
the benefit of the member businesses,
their employees, and for the communities
where the businesses operate. The goals
of these ERNs are to provide sustainable
employment throughout all segments
of the workforce by efficiently utilizing
community supports, and help under- and
unemployed residents of the community
maintain employment and move into
economic self-sufficiency.
These networks have been particularly
successful with small and midsized
firms that pool resources to accomplish
together what they cannot accomplish
individually. The distinguishing feature
of each ERN is that participating
businesses pay membership fees that are
used to fund a case manager—referred to
by ERN members as a “success coach”—
from the public human services system
to locate on-site at each business or in a
central location.
Participating employers expect to
experience lower turnover rates and
lower consequent hiring costs, reduced
expenses and hassles associated with
worker tardiness and absenteeism, and
improved productivity. These benefits are
expected as workers, facilitated in many
cases by the success coach, are better able
to focus on their work activity and stay

on the job longer. Employers also expect
some cost savings related to training and
worker skill development through this
consortium approach to human resource
support and services.
This article presents the results from a
survey that was conducted to determine
the components necessary to form a
successful ERN. Thirteen representatives
from six west Michigan ERNs were
interviewed to gather evidence reflecting
on seven issues that emerged from
a study contrasting the launch and
operations of two of the six ERNs
during the fall of 2010. (See Hollenbeck,
Erickcek, and Timmeney 2011).
The survey respondents were
purposively chosen and, for the most
part, were ardent supporters of ERNs at
participating firms. Of those interviewed,
two were company owners and the
remaining were all vice presidents
of human resources (HR) within the
participating firms. The length of time
that the ERNs had existed ranged from
the conceptual stage in two sites to
nearly 10 years at one of the sites. These
particular respondents allow us to address
seven questions about what works in
forming a successful ERN through the
perspectives of advocates who have
diligently committed to the concept.
1) Is the size of the ERN important
for success?
The ERNs represented by the
interviewees ranged in membership size
from 5 to 17 employers. Respondents
confirmed our hypothesis that fewer
than 5 employers may not be a viable
number of firms for an ERN. They said
that the minimum number of employers
needed to create group synergy and cost
effectiveness was 5–6, and emphasized
that an ERN’s optimal size depends on

the number of employees at the firm and
service usage amongst each of the firms.
Scale is important because it
determines the individual firm’s financial
contribution to the consortium, and
because governance and operation of
the initiative requires the employers’
investment of time and energy. The
average employment level per firm in
this study was approximately 75–100
employees (some ERNs included firms
with much larger employment levels).
Using this average employment level per
firm and the minimum number of firms
per ERN, the scale of employment at
member firms must be at least 375–600.
However, further variables must be
considered when determining ERN size.
Optimal scale must include a balance
of considerations such as the number of
employees receiving welfare assistance,
firm size, utilization of services,

In all of the interviews where
the ERN was fully operational,
the respondents believed
that there were individuals
whose jobs had been saved
because of ERN intervention.
geographic location and expanse of
member firms, and industry mix.
An issue closely related to scale is
the fee structure of the ERN. Should
fees be based on employment levels or
utilization, or should there be a flat fee
for all members? Utilization level was
used by only one of the ERNs as the
method for calculating fee structure.
Representatives from other ERNs
believed strongly that a flat fee is a more
useful method. Utilization can vary
significantly from year to year, and a
varying fee means that costs must be
argued for yearly with the CEO or upperlevel management. Equal funding or a
flat fee applied across all firms is easier
to budget for and lessens the need for
annual advocacy for participation. Some
respondents also believed that under a
utilization fee structure, firms with higher
utilization, by right of paying higher fees,
have more say in programming or design
discussions, whereas a flat fee levels the
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playing field for the smaller or midsized
firms.
2) How do ERNs fare during
a recession?
During the recent recession, firms
were laying off substantial shares of their
workforces. Some firms may be hesitant
to invest in an ERN because of concerns
about business or economic downturns.
Even though ERNs exist to improve
worker retention and skill building, in
the recent recession, the respondents
confirmed that ERNs still provided
value in retention and recruitment.
Success coaches dealt with situations in
which family members other than the
worker were laid off. Furthermore, when
possible, networking HR managers in
the ERNs assisted each other in placing
workers who were laid off. Not only
did the success coaches provide value
to the firms and employees, the HR
managers and firms reaped the benefits
of the network of HR knowledge and
connections.
3) Is it important to have
sectoral diversity?
The existing ERNs have members
from across a spectrum of industries.
Respondents indicated that this enhanced
the sharing of experiences and policies.
Furthermore, the diversification
dampened the effect of the business cycle
as some firms had stable employment
levels over the cycle and others
fluctuated. A health care collaborative
did emerge and functioned well, but
coincidentally has merged with another
nearby multisector network in an effort to
streamline network coordination costs.
4) Can ERNs succeed if member firms
are not located near each other?
The neighborhood model of an ERN
has many advantages, but most of the
individuals interviewed in this study
were in ERNs that covered fairly wide
geography. The trade-off for the latter
is that these ERNs must achieve scale,
but they must also operate within an
area that can be efficiently served by
a success coach. An ERN located in a
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small geographic area is most likely to be
successful in a larger metropolitan area
with a concentration of firms.
5) Are ERNs more successful if they
have ties to other ERNs?
The achievements and energy of an
ERN seem to be enhanced if it has ties
to another ERN. The growth and success
of four of the ERNs were somewhat
dependent on the spillover in awareness
from the original two ERNs’ experience
and successes. Conversely, the demise of
the one ERN no longer in existence can
be partially attributed to a “cold” start.
In that case, none of the participating
firms had had any experience with an
ERN. Rather, the firms that joined the
initiative committed to participate based
on evidence presented to them about the
success of other ERNs.
In contrast, many of the health care
firms in other successful ERNs have
an industry connection, and several of
the manufacturers have employed vice
presidents of human resources that were
previously employed in HR at founding
member companies of the original ERN.
The five representatives interviewed
from the ERNs in the start-up phase
all indicated that their knowledge and
contacts with HR professionals at the
operational ERNs were instrumental in
their explorations of the feasibility and
subsequent commitment to participation
in their local ERNs. These interactions
depict yet another networking benefit of
ERNs versus starting from scratch.
6) What are the roles of HR managers
and other upper-level management/
owners in successful ERNs?
Clearly an investment in an ERN
requires CEO or upper-management
approval, and thus they are the targets
of marketing efforts, which may come
from an internal source—usually the vice
president of HR—or from other CEOs or
management. Once upper-level managers
decide to participate, however, they
typically do not participate in the ERN.
The interviews confirmed that ERNs
exemplify the importance of aligning
incentives. The HR representatives
interviewed all indicated that their jobs

were made easier with the availability of
a success coach, who improved employee
retention and, in many cases, offered
valuable training. The respondents
reported that the benefits of participation
clearly outweighed the fees paid by the
firm for participation. Without an ERN,
the firms would have had to rely on
their own resources to address employee
performance or attendance issues, usually
without clear knowledge or time to
address the possible underlying causes. A
success coach is specifically trained and
can offer years of experience with this
base of knowledge.
In all of the interviews where the ERN
was fully operational, the respondents
believed that there were individuals
whose jobs had been saved because of
ERN intervention. They said that ERN
participation had saved the firm the
costs of terminating these employees,
recruiting replacements, and training the
new hires. Since employee participation
and service provision are confidential,
the HR staff members do not know who
is served or the specific services they
have been provided. However, the survey
respondents indicated that transportation
was the primary need that was addressed,
along with auto repair, financial help, and
assistance with food and utilities.
Two HR managers interviewed
independently commented that the ERN
model offered a concrete way to engage
in the workforce development system.
They found the model to be mutually
beneficial to their firms and their workers
as well as a means to contribute to the
local human services delivery systems.
This aspect of the ERN concept was also
a tool that these HR managers used to
sell participation and the associated fee to
upper management.
7) What are the networking advantages
of ERNs?
As with any business start up, ERNs
have a business plan to guide their
development. As the ERN moves from
a group of interested firms convening
around the concept to the stage of
launching and implementation, these
business plans are developed by the
founding members of the ERN. Close
relationships develop between the
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participants, especially when they share
the common role of HR professional
in their firms. It is through this process
that the governing group becomes a
resource for networking.
Each of the respondents commented
that networking, regardless of industry
representation or geographic proximity,
serves as a valuable function of the
ERN. The ERNs meet on at least a
quarterly basis, but communication
occurs frequently in between meetings.
In person, or more often by phone,
representatives share practical
experience on issues such as how to
control costs, how to adjust to a new
personnel policy, or mutual training
needs. An issue that was a primary
barrier in all firms was communicating
to all employees the services available
from the success coach. Through the
networking, ERN supporters shared
ideas on how to successfully market
the ERN within their organizations.
Ultimately, it was during these regular
discussions that participating firms
learned how they could potentially
share services that facilitate the
implementation of the business plan
and enable the ERN to thrive.
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New Book on the Affordable Care Act
The Health and Wealth of a Nation
Employer-Based Health Insurance and the Affordable Care Act
Nan L. Maxwell
In this timely new book, Nan L. Maxwell examines the behavior
of firms with respect to their provision of health care prior to ACA
deliberations and uses those behaviors
to forecast changes in employersponsored health insurance (ESI) once
the ACA is fully implemented. Her
analysis focuses on potential changes
in the ESI offer due to implementation
of ACA provisions concerning access
and quality.
“Because the ACA structures
provisions to narrow gaps in the ESI
offer, my research can shed light
on the extent to which the ACA
provisions might change the ESI
offer, and whether changes are likely
to reduce disparities between lowwage and high-wage workers.”
–Nan L. Maxwell
Maxwell’s findings include:
• The ACA will likely influence the behavior of virtually all firms that
offered health insurance at the time of its passage.
• The ACA is unlikely to incentivize small firms to offer health
insurance if they did not already offer it when the act was passed.
• The differences in ESI coverage and quality of the offer made to lowwage and high-wage workers is likely to converge when the ACA is
fully implemented.
• Disparities in the offer of benefits other than health insurance might
increase between low-wage and high-wage firms.
Nan L. Maxwell is a senior researcher in the Oakland, California, office of
Mathematica Policy Research. She was formerly a professor and chair in the
Department of Economics and the executive director of the Human Investment
Research and Education Center (HIRE) at California State University, East Bay.
203 pp. July 2012
$40.00 cloth 978-0-88099-425-5 / $20.00 paper 978-0-88099-423-1
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